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Research Summary: We draw upon applied psychology
literature to explore interagent differences in perceived risk
to their equity when making strategic risk decisions. Our
theory suggests behavioral agency's predicted negative rela-
tionship between equity risk bearing and strategic risk tak-
ing is contingent upon four personality traits. Our empirical
analyses, based on personality profiles of 158 Chief Execu-
tive Officers (CEOs) of S&P 1,500 firms in manufacturing
industries, indicate the relationship between executive risk
bearing and strategic risk taking crosses from negative to
positive for high extraversion, greater openness, and low
conscientiousness. These findings demonstrate that agency
based predictions of CEO risk taking in response to
compensation—and board attempts at creating incentive
alignment using compensation—are enhanced by integrat-
ing insights from personality trait literature.
Managerial Summary: We study the effect of CEO per-
sonality on their behavioral responses to stock option pay.
Our findings reveal that CEOs that score high on extraver-
sion or openness and low on conscientiousness are less
likely to decrease their firm's strategic risk taking as the
value of their stock options increases. That is, the ten-
dency of CEOs to become more risk averse in their strate-
gic choices as their option wealth increases (due to loss
aversion) is weaker for highly extraverted and more open
CEOs, but stronger for more conscientiousness CEOs.
Overall, our findings suggest that board of directors need
to consider personality traits of their CEOs when design-
ing compensation packages with the intention to align
incentives of CEOs with shareholder risk preferences.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Behavioral agency scholars have devoted considerable effort to examining risk behaviors incentiv-
ized by compensation (e.g., Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008;
Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Lim, 2015; Martin, Gomez-Mejia, &
Wiseman, 2013; Martin, Washburn, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia, 2015; Pepper & Gore, 2015; Wise-
man & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The behavioral agency model (BAM) proposes that executive risk bear-
ing has a negative effect upon the risk they take on behalf of their firm (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998). Risk bearing is defined as the perceived wealth-at-risk of loss in the event of failed risk taking;
equity risk bearing is the equity wealth component of their firm-specific wealth (Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998).1 However, this body of research has featured mixed findings and been largely impotent
in recent debates concerning how to structure compensation in the wake of the Great Recession. For
instance, different forms of equity risk bearing have been found to have different and sometimes
insignificant effects upon agent risk behavior (Devers et al., 2008). These factors have led some to
lament that, despite decades of research, we are still unable to predict how executives respond to
compensation (Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).
A particularly salient shortcoming within the agency research predicting Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) behaviors has been the failure to consider how individual CEOs differ in their responses to
compensation arrangements in general and equity compensation in particular (Mannor, Wowak, Bart-
kus, & Gomez-Mejia, 2016; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010; Wowak, Mannor, & Wowak, 2015). That
is, much of the behavioral agency literature is based on the implicit assumption that managerial
agents will perceive similar levels of risk to a given amount of equity wealth regardless of individual
differences in personality. However, this assumption runs counter to an extensive stream of applied
psychology literature demonstrating the importance of considering how different dimensions of per-
sonality shape executive decision making, such as through influencing perceived threat, optimism,
prescience regarding gain or loss outcomes and comfort with uncertainty (e.g., Bono & Judge, 2004;
Boudreau, Boswell, Judge, & Bretz, 2001; Judge & Bono, 2000; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt,
2002; Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003). Five personality traits have proven instrumental
to predicting individual behaviors and the cognitive processes associated with decision making under
uncertainty: conscientiousness, neuroticism, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness (McCrae &
Costa, 1987). Indeed, the seminal development and subsequent refinements to the five-factor model
has received more than 120,000 citations. Given its strong foundation and prominence elsewhere, it
is curious that agency research has not leveraged this literature in the context of CEOs' risk response
to equity compensation (Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).
1Subjective estimations of probabilities of loss and the magnitude of loss are taken together to estimate the total wealth-at-risk of los—
or risk bearing of individuals—when making decisions under uncertainty that will affect their wealth (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
We extend this to include the CEO's strategic decisions that will impact firm share price and hence option wealth.
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In this study, we develop a framework that explains how the various personality traits moderate
the predicted negative relationship between CEO equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking. The
personality trait literature provides the foundation for analyzing how individuals perceive risk. Risk
perception is how much risk an individual subjectively estimates is inherent to a decision situation
(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). We draw on this logic to explore the impact of CEO personality on their per-
ception of risk to their equity wealth when making strategic risk decisions on behalf of their firm. To
illustrate, in the case of the extraversion/introversion scale, the personality literature argues that extra-
vert CEOs are optimistic, suggesting prospective gain outcomes are likely to be more salient. Greater
salience of gains—to firm performance and therefore to CEO equity wealth—leads to a lower risk
perception when making strategic risk decisions on behalf of the firm (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995).2
This suggests that extravert CEOs will perceive less risk to a given amount of equity wealth; there-
fore, BAM's predicted negative effect of equity risk bearing on strategic risk taking is likely to be
weaker for extravert CEOs.
Using a validated approach to collecting psychometric data that is consistent with prior research
(McCrae, Costa, & Busch, 1986; Peterson et al., 2003), we gathered personality profiles on 158 CEOs
of S&P 1,500 manufacturing firms to test our theory regarding the moderating effect of personality
traits upon CEOs' response to equity incentives. We focus on manufacturing firms given that
(a) decisions regarding capital expenditure and R&D are argued to be most critical to creating and
maintaining competitive advantage in these industries; and (b) the behavioral agency discourse that
we are joining has focused on the same dependent variable and used the same industry subset
(e.g., Devers et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2013). We find broad support for our hypotheses.3
Our study offers important theoretical contributions for the governance and behavioral agency lit-
erature. First, we advance behavioral agency literature by drawing on the personality literature to
offer the insight that CEOs are likely to differ in how they perceive risk, which affects how they
respond to equity incentives. In doing so, we advance behavioral agency theory by demonstrating
that predictive validity is enhanced by relaxing BAM's implicit assumption of no interagent variation
in the perception of risk inherent to a given amount of endowed equity wealth. Indeed, our findings
suggest that three personality traits are associated with cross-over interaction effects with CEO equity
risk bearing: the relationship between equity risk bearing and risk taking shifts from negative to posi-
tive (see Figure 1a–c), underlining the importance of integrating the personality trait with behavioral
agency literature. Our study therefore advances behavioral agency theory by suggesting that the
aforementioned mixed findings in executive compensation research could be attributed—at least in
part—to the omission of the personality trait and applied psychology literatures when predicting
executive responses to compensation.
Second, we demonstrate the value added by systematically integrating agency theory and research
from applied psychology to more accurately explain CEO strategic risk taking. Third, our findings
imply that CEO framing of strategic decision making can be endogenous to the decision maker and
specifically, their individual sense making processes, shaped by personality. Taken together, our con-
tributions draw attention to individual differences in CEO responses to their equity wealth; that is,
the consequences of equity incentives for incentive alignment may be vastly different across individ-
uals. At a practical level, this means that boards need to consider such individual personality
2The positive correlation between firm performance and the value of CEO equity means that the extraverted CEO will perceive less risk
to both the firm and their equity wealth.
3We do not develop theory for the trait of agreeableness given the lack of clear theoretical guidance as to how this personality dimen-
sion influences risk propensity and risk perception.
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differences when attempting to align incentives of CEOs with shareholder risk preferences through
equity grants.
2 | BEHAVIORAL AGENCY THEORY
Agency theory argues that costs are imposed upon shareholders due to separation of managers and
owners (shareholders), divergent goals and risk preferences between managers and shareholders, and
the difficulty of observing manager behaviors, particularly when ownership is dispersed (Berle &
Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Equity based pay had been proposed as a panacea for the
agency problem by ensuring that managers behave as owners, leading to greater effort and less per-
quisite consumption (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the concentration of agent
financial and human capital may create additional risk bearing for the agent principal (e.g., Beatty &
Zajac, 1994; Holmstrom, 1979), leading to risk profile divergence between the (a) managerial agent,
who is assumed risk averse; and (b) shareholder principal who is assumed risk neutral due to their
diversified investment portfolio (Eisenhardt, 1989).
BAM changed the way agency scholars conceptualize agent risk preferences by replacing the
assumption of agent risk aversion with the empirically grounded concept of loss aversion from pros-
pect theory; loss aversion suggests individuals weigh prospective losses more heavily than gains
when making decisions under uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, managerial agent risk
preferences depend upon the CEO's perception of threats to endowed equity wealth, which is wealth
the CEO has included in their subjective assessment of personal wealth such as the accumulated
value of stock options (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The endowed wealth equates to prospec-
tive losses due to declines in the firm's share price. This linkage of CEO and shareholder wealth leads
to the agency problem of risk sharing: sharing the risk of firm performance with both agent and prin-
cipal (Eisenhardt, 1989). Risk sharing exacerbates agent concentration of wealth in the focal firm,
leading the CEO to become increasingly risk averse, driving a wedge between CEO (agent) risk pref-
erences and the risk preferences of shareholders, who are assumed to be risk neutral due to a diversi-
fied portfolio (Eisenhardt, 1989; Holmstrom, 1979). The greater the CEO's endowed wealth that
bears performance risk (e.g., equity wealth), the less risk the CEO is willing to take, leading to the
BAM's prediction that agent risk bearing—such as in the form of firm-specific equity wealth—will
be negatively related to risk taking on behalf of the firm.
Importantly, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) emphasize the perceptual nature of risk, drawing
on the model of Sitkin and Pablo (1992) to highlight the role of perceived risk in influencing risk
decisions by executives on behalf of the firm. BAM suggests that risk perception is influenced by the
CEO's subjective assessment of the probability that their decision making on behalf of the firm is
unsuccessful; the CEO would associate these downside outcomes for the firm with personal losses in
their equity wealth, based on the positive correlation between firm performance and the share price
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998, p. 137). That is, BAM acknowledges that the risk to agent per-
sonal wealth is perceptual and the CEO estimates this risk by assessing the uncertainty of firm level
outcomes when making strategic decisions on behalf of the firm.
As we note above, absent from behavioral agency research has been a systematic theoretical
explanation as to why managerial agents differ in the risk they perceive to their equity wealth when
making strategic decisions on behalf of their firm (Wowak & Hambrick, 2010). Specifically, previous
research tends to neglect the role of CEO personality as a contingency that may influence how the
CEO perceives risk to accumulated equity wealth when making strategic decisions on behalf of their
firm (Wowak et al., 2015; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010). That is, an implicit assumption in behavioral
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agency research has been that CEOs will perceive the same level of risk to a given amount of equity
wealth—that is, there is no interagent variation in the salience of loss (gain) firm outcomes that could
negatively (positively) impact their equity wealth—in the calculus that precedes strategic risk taking,
regardless of individual differences in personality. This assumption, however, runs counter to the
well-established applied psychology research suggesting that there are differences in individuals' risk
perception, depending on the various personality traits (Peterson et al., 2003). Perception equates to a
subjective estimation of the probability and magnitude of loss (Johnson & Tversky, 1983) and is
shaped by the salience of gain or loss outcomes; greater salience of losses (gains) is associated with
higher (lower) risk perception (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). If perceived risk is a function of personality
(Peterson et al., 2003) and risk to the CEO's equity wealth when making strategic decisions is percep-
tual, it seems logical that BAM would benefit from considering CEO personality when predicting the
influence of equity risk bearing upon CEO strategic risk taking.
3 | PERSONALITY AND STRATEGIC RISK TAKING
As noted above, following prior management research on personality traits (Herrmann & Nadkarni,
2014; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010; Peterson et al., 2003), we focus on the five-factor model (the
“Big Five”) of CEO personality (see Digman, 1990 for an in-depth discussion of the emergence of
the five-factor model) to examine the moderating effect of CEO personality on the relationship
between CEO risk bearing (associated with equity wealth) and strategic risk taking. Indeed, prior
work—mainly grounded in upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984)—has studied the
effect of psychological attributes such as confidence levels (Li & Tang, 2010), core self-evaluation
(Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010), narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011), or job anxiety
(Mannor et al., 2016) on organizational decisions and outcomes. Based on the premise that psy-
chological attributes will shape attention, selection and interpretation of environmental stimuli
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), these studies convincingly demonstrate that psychological attributes
have a direct effect on CEO decision-making. Yet, while this body of research has created a space
within the management literature that considers CEOs psychological attributes as an important
antecedent of organizational outcomes, prior research offers limited theoretical and empirical
insights into how personality interacts with compensation and specifically equity compensation
(Wowak & Hambrick, 2010). Here, we draw on the personality trait literature to assess personality
differences across individuals and how they interact with equity wealth to predict strategic risk
taking.
We focus on personality trait research from the five-factor model for two reasons. First, recent
work by Nadkarni and Herrmann (2010) illustrates the predictive validity of the five-factor model in
the context of strategic management, such as when explaining CEO strategic decision making (see
also Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014). They demonstrate that CEO personality is related to strategic flex-
ibility which in turn drives firm performance. Similarly, Peterson et al. (2003) illustrate how CEO
personality influences top management team dynamics. More importantly, these studies suggest that
the five-factor model may indeed explain individual differences in risk perceptions (see also Malho-
tra, Reus, Zhu, & Roelofsen, 2018). Second, the five-factor model is strongly established as a pillar
of personality psychology research (e.g., Digman, 1990) because it efficiently describes a unique set
of personality traits that drives individual's behaviors (Boudreau et al., 2001). We therefore leverage
the five-factor model to examine how CEO personality influences CEOs' perception of risk to their
firm-specific equity wealth when making strategic risk decisions.
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3.1 | Personality traits, risk perception, and strategic risk taking
While technical definitions of risk focus on probability of outcomes, magnitude of outcomes and var-
iance in outcomes (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), limited cognitive capacity and the human need for
simplification means that it is unlikely decision makers consider all three dimensions of risk in a
rational manner (Weber & Milliman, 1997). Instead, the decision making process is simplified by
cognitive heuristics that efficiently estimate risk inherent to a situation (or the perceived risk), thereby
making selective use of available data (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Weber & Milliman, 1997). For
example, heuristics are used to assess the odds of failure or success when estimating risk
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Risk perception is therefore shaped by these subjective judgments,
along with an individual's interpretation of more formal modelling (bounded by cognitive con-
straints). Drawing on these insights, the related concepts of bounded rationality and heuristics have
been central to behavioral research examining how decision makers perceive risk when making
choices (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
In their model of individual risk behavior, Sitkin and Pablo (1992) develop the role of risk per-
ception in predicting risk taking by describing how risk perception is shaped by the salience of loss
or gain outcomes. If individuals are focused more upon the prospect of loss outcomes, the subjective
estimate of the probability of the loss event becomes higher, meaning they perceive higher risk
(Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Conversely, if individuals are more prescient with regard to gain out-
comes, those upside possibilities become more salient in the decision making process; hence, the
decision maker perceives lower risk due to salience of gain outcomes (March & Shapira, 1987). In
sum, in any given decision situation, high salience of loss outcomes equates to high perceived risk
and greater salience of gain outcomes equates to lower perceived risk.
We noted above BAM's prediction that CEOs are expected to take less risk as their equity risk
bearing increases, due to aversion to losses in that wealth if risk taking on behalf of their firm is
unsuccessful (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This proposition is based on the insight that higher
perceived risk of firm level losses equates to higher perceived risk of equity wealth loss. This draws
on logic that has provided the foundation for the literature exploring the agency problem: CEOs bear
performance risk (personal exposure to firm performance declines) due to equity based pay, resulting
in divergence in risk profiles of CEO and shareholders. Using this logic, BAM argues that the perfor-
mance risk borne by the CEO is proportionate to their equity wealth and weighs on the CEO when
making strategic decisions. Yet, as also noted above, BAM does not consider that the perception of
risk inherent to a given amount of endowed equity wealth may differ across agents. Relaxing this
assumption, we therefore argue below that salience of firm level loss outcomes to the CEO will be a
function of their personality traits. Greater salience of losses leads to higher perceived risk of (a) firm
share price decline when making strategic risk decisions on behalf of their firm, and as a result
(b) equity wealth loss due to those share price declines.
3.1.1 | Conscientiousness, risk perception, and strategic risk taking
Conscientiousness describes two important aspects of personality: achievement orientation and
dependability (Judge & Bono, 2000). Conscientious individuals are seen as dependable, following
established rules and obeying norms, making them reliable and responsible (Costa & MacCrae, 1992;
Fong & Tosi, 2007). They prefer being in control (Judge & Bono, 2000). The more uncertain the out-
comes associated with any decision, the more vulnerable one becomes to external events and to the
effort of others, which does not sit comfortably with conscientious individuals (Miller & Toulouse,
1986). It follows that potential loss outcomes are likely to weigh heavily upon conscientious individ-
uals (Peterson et al., 2003), which in turn makes loss outcomes more salient. That is, while loss
158 BENISCHKE ET AL.
outcomes are weighed more heavily than gains across all individuals (according to the logic of loss
aversion), loss outcomes are likely to be more salient for more conscientious individuals.
Given the association between conscientiousness and greater salience of loss outcomes argued
above, we posit that more conscientious CEOs are likely to perceive higher risk of firm performance
declines in the strategic decisions they make on behalf of their firm. We expect this higher CEO risk
perception at the firm level translates into higher perceived risk to equity wealth-at-risk (equity risk
bearing) given that this wealth's value fluctuates with the firm's share price. We therefore argue that
increases in CEO equity wealth evoke a stronger behavioral response for conscientious CEOs due to
the greater salience of loss outcomes and hence higher perceived risk to a given level of equity wealth
(relative to less conscientious CEOs). Said differently, the decision biases associated with loss
aversion—the tendency to avoid losses in accumulated wealth and frame risk taking as a threat to that
wealth—are likely to be accentuated when the CEO is more conscientious due to higher perceived
risk of personal wealth loss. This leads to our formal prediction:
Hypothesis 1: CEO conscientiousness accentuates the negative effect of equity risk
bearing on strategic risk taking.
3.1.2 | Neuroticism, risk perception and strategic risk taking
Neuroticism reflects the adaptability of individuals to different situational demands; more neurotic
individuals are also described as less emotionally stable and less adaptable, meaning they are less
likely to remain calm when having to adapt to new situations (McCrae & Costa, 1997). Neuroticism
is considered a multi-dimensional construct consisting of factors such as pessimism, worry and self-
doubt (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Pessimism and worry are associated with pre-occupation
with downside outcomes, as the individual obsesses over what could go wrong (Carver, 1989). Said
differently, the salience of loss outcomes is likely to be greater for neurotic individuals (Hemenover,
2001); given salience of loss equates to higher risk perception, neurotic individuals are likely to per-
ceive higher risk in any given decision (e.g., Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014; Nadkarni & Herr-
mann, 2010).
Building on the above logic, we argue that neuroticism is likely to lead to higher perceived risk to
equity wealth when a CEO is making strategic decisions with uncertain payoffs. In other words, neu-
roticism is likely to accentuate cognitive tendencies to focus on loss outcomes in the calculus associ-
ated with risk taking. It follows that neurotic CEOs are more likely to perceive greater firm risk and
therefore a greater threat to a given amount of equity wealth-at-risk (equity risk bearing) when mak-
ing decisions on behalf of the firm. Therefore, increases in equity wealth-at-risk (equity risk bearing)
are more likely to result in a further reduction of strategic risk taking when the CEO is more neurotic,
as decisions to take additional risk on behalf of their firm are more likely to be framed as an unneces-
sary threat to their wealth. This equates to our predicted accentuation effect of CEO neuroticism upon
the negative relationship between CEO equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking:
Hypothesis 2: CEO neuroticism accentuates the negative effect of equity risk bearing
on strategic risk taking.
3.1.3 | Extraversion, risk perception and strategic risk taking
Extraversion is grounded in the work by Eysenck (1973) who broadly conceptualize this personality
dimension as a need for stimulation. Following this definition, Hogan (1986) suggests that extraver-
sion captures individuals' ambition (reflected in traits such as surgency, excitement seeking, or asser-
tiveness) and sociability (related to traits such as sociable, fun-loving, affectionate, friendly, or
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talkative). Extraverts tend to be optimistic and seek adventure (Judge & Cable, 1997). The same way
that pessimism above is described as increasing the salience of loss outcomes, optimism associated
with extraversion creates a pre-occupation with the upside outcomes, making the gain outcomes more
salient. Given gain outcomes are more salient for extraverted individuals, they are likely to perceive
lower risk. This, for example, is reflected by their propensity to pursue strategies that are considered
to be particularly challenging (Bono & Judge, 2004; Malhotra et al., 2018). Similarly, extravert CEOs
show greater willingness to challenge the status quo and are thus more likely to initiate strategic
change (Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014). It follows that extraverted individuals exhibit a bias toward
focusing on firm level wins and associated personal equity gains they could reap if things go well,
meaning that success—rather than failure—is more salient in their decision making (Hemenover,
2001). Therefore, with their attention directed toward successful strategic risk taking, the extravert
CEO is likely to perceive less risk of failure when making decisions on behalf of the firm; this
equates to less perceived threat to their equity wealth. Said differently, greater salience of gain out-
comes is associated with lower perceived risk to a given amount of equity wealth when making stra-
tegic decisions that will impact the value of that wealth.
In sum, we argue that increases in equity wealth will evoke a weaker behavioral response for
extravert CEOs, meaning that extravert CEOs are less likely to respond to increases in equity wealth-
at-risk (equity risk bearing) by reducing strategic risk taking to preserve their equity wealth (relative
to introvert CEOs). Hence:
Hypothesis 3: CEO extraversion attenuates the negative effect of equity risk bearing
on strategic risk taking.
3.1.4 | Openness, risk perception and strategic risk taking
Individuals that score high on openness to experience are best characterized as “original, imaginative,
having broad interests, and daring” (McCrae & Costa, 1987, p. 87; see also McCrae, 1987). Open
leaders are more receptive to new experiences such as new feelings, thoughts, perspectives, and ideas
(George & Zhou, 2001). Therefore, open leaders actively seek creative solutions to problems and
show greater willingness to challenge the status quo (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). Similarly, open
CEOs tend to adopt leadership styles that encourage followers to question old assumptions, thereby
facilitating divergent thinking and the expression of new ideas and new perspectives (Judge & Bono,
2000). To ensure that new ideas and perspectives are actively considered, it is necessary to sell “what
could be,” or positive outcomes, to open the minds of colleagues or investors. For example, open
CEOs are more likely to see a vision for their company and are also able to sell this internally
(Bono & Judge, 2004), meaning that the positive outcomes that they are trying to sell are likely to
become more vivid in their own decision making processes. This suggests that openness to a diverse
set of ideas may translate into greater prescience with regard to the upside of strategic decisions
(Lauriola & Levin, 2001); hence, gain outcomes are more salient for more open individuals and the
perceived risk in any decision is likely to be lower.
In sum, strategic risk taking will be perceived as creating less risk to a given amount of equity
wealth when CEOs are higher on the openness scale (relative to less open CEOs), making them less
likely to reduce firm strategic risk as their equity risk bearing increases:
Hypothesis 4: CEO openness to experience attenuates the negative effect of equity risk
bearing on strategic risk taking.
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3.1.5 | Agreeableness, risk perception, and strategic risk taking
Agreeable individuals are trusting, kind and cooperative; they tend to avoid conflict and value rela-
tionships (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Prior research has found this to be the most complex of the five
traits when predicting CEO behaviors (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). This will be, at least in part,
because it is difficult to predict how an agreeable CEO will behave without examining the prefer-
ences of those around the CEO. But it is also because the personality trait literature does not give
clear theoretical guidance regarding CEO risk perception of agreeable individuals. Hence, we do not
develop a hypothesis for this personality trait.
4 | METHODOLOGY
4.1 | Sample and data sources
Our sample consists of CEOs of S&P 1,500 firms who were appointed in the years 2004 and 2005.
This approach has allowed us to gather a representative, but manageable sample and our approach is
broadly consistent with that used by Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino (2013). Following the collapse of
the “dot-com bubble” between 1999 and 2002, there was significant economic turmoil affecting not
only internet companies but also noninternet firms. In order to avoid the possibility that CEO
appointments were confounded by the effects of the dot-com bubble, we focus on the years 2004 and
2005 during which the stock markets and wider economy had already stabilized. For instance, Gold-
farb, Kirsch, and Miller (2007) report that most bankruptcies associated with the collapse of the dot-
com bubble took place before 2004. Moreover, popular video-sharing platforms such as YouTube
were founded around that time allowing us to also include video clips in our coding process
(Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill, 2016).
We applied three additional sampling filters. First, consistent with prior behavioral agency studies
(e.g., Devers et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2013), we have limited our sample to CEOs in manufacturing
industries (two digit SIC code 20–39) given the industry-specificity of our strategic risk taking mea-
sure. The logic behind this is that capital expenditure and R&D are more likely to be larger and criti-
cal to the success of manufacturing firms given they have a larger proportion of total assets invested
in property, plant and equipment; this suggests R&D that innovates manufacturing processes and cap-
ital expenditure that is necessary to house and produce products are more likely to attract the attention
of the CEOs of manufacturing firms (Devers et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2013). Moreover, based on
the two-digit SIC code, manufacturing firms constituted the largest group of firms in the S&P 1500
in 2005 (638 firms), followed by finance (235 firms) and services (218 firms). Second, we excluded
five interim CEOs that served for less than two fiscal years. This was important as we were interested
in observing the effect of CEO personality on strategic risk taking over time (Ballinger & Marcel,
2010). Third, for similar reasons we also excluded Antonio Alvarez who was appointed CEO of
Interstate Bakeries in September 2004 as “turnaround consultant.” Turnaround consultants are often
brought in for relatively a short period of time and our theory may thus not apply to such special
cases. After applying these criteria, our sample is comprised of 158 individual CEOs that were
appointed in 2004 or 2005.
Most CEOs in our sample were appointed to firms in the “Electronic and Other Electrical Equip-
ment and Components” (41 firms) industry, followed by “Industrial and Commercial Machinery and
Computer Equipment” (26 firms), and “Chemicals and Allied Products” (21 firms). Additional t-tests
showed that the firms included in our sample are not significantly different from the remaining S&P
1500 manufacturing firms in terms of total assets (p = 0.688; rejecting the null that the means are
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equal), revenue (p = 0.916), as well as number of employees (p = 0.379). In our sample, we
included observations up to 2012. Thus, if a CEO was appointed in 2004 and remained in office until
2012, we would have 9 years of observation for that CEO. After excluding cases with missing data,
our approach yielded a pooled time series of 935 firm-year observations.
The measurement of the independent variables—the personality traits—presents a major chal-
lenge. Although preferred, directly measuring CEO personality—for instance through a survey
instrument—is difficult as CEOs of large publicly listed firms are often unwilling to complete com-
prehensive psychometric surveys (Hambrick, 2007). In addition to the fact that such surveys are
time-consuming, complete information about CEO's personality profiles is also very sensitive as the
results of such psychometric surveys may jeopardize the CEO's career. While some have succeeded
in collecting primary data (e.g., Herrmann & Nadkarni, 2014; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010), these
studies have focused on relatively small firms located in emerging economies. In contrast, we focus
on CEOs of S&P 1,500 manufacturing firms, meaning that obtaining comprehensive first-hand infor-
mation about CEOs personality profiles is deemed infeasible (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011;
Wowak, Mannor, Arrfelt, & McNamara, 2016). Instead, we follow prior research (e.g., Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Peterson et al., 2003; Petrenko et al., 2016; Wowak et al., 2016) and adopt an
unobtrusive approach to measure CEO personality.
Specifically, we closely follow the historiometric technique used by Peterson et al. (2003) to mea-
sure the personality traits (this approach has also been used in other disciplines such as political econ-
omy; see for example Hermann, 1976, 1980). As a first step, we compiled dossiers containing all
information we could find about the CEO. We only include information that we can directly attribute
to the CEO; that is, we exclude information from secondary sources such as comments relating to the
CEO's personality made by third parties. We used multiple independent archival data sources to
obtain information about each CEO. For instance, we include biographic information about each
CEO, interviews with the CEO, newspaper articles containing direct quotes of the CEO, transcripts
of unscripted question and answer sessions that are part of conference calls with analysts and investor
conferences, and writings that can be directly attributed to the CEO such as articles, memos, and
emails. If available, we further include video samples showing the CEO giving public speeches, lec-
tures at universities, or interviews. To identify this information, we performed systematic Google
searches using the name of the CEO as keyword as well as additional searches using Lexis/Nexis.
This approach resulted in extensive dossiers—in each dossier we included a minimum of 15 pages
and video samples if available—about each CEOs included in our study. Specifically, the average
dossier consisted of one document with biographic information, three videos, three interviews,
25 conference calls, one writing that can be attributed to the CEO, and one newspaper article includ-
ing quotes from the CEO.4 In the second step, we trained three coders that subsequently used the Cal-
ifornia Adult Q-Set (CAQ; Block, 1978) to describe the personality of each CEO based on the
dossiers we had prepared. These techniques allowed us to obtain personality data on 158 CEOs.
4.2 | Dependent variable
4.2.1 | Strategic risk taking
In order to ensure consistency with prior behavioral agency research examining CEO strategic risk
taking (e.g., Devers et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2013) we adopt a measure of strategic risk taking using
long-term debt, R&D spending and capital expenditures from Compustat. Long-term debt was mea-
sured taking the debt with maturity beyond 1 year held on each firm's balance sheet. R&D spending
4The dossiers are available upon request from the first author.
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was measured by the annual expenditure in a given year and capital expenditure is the firm's spending
on plant, equipment and property. We factor-analyzed the three measures and found that all of them
loaded above 0.80. All variables loaded on a single factor having an eigenvalue of 2.3 and accounting
for 76% of the variance suggesting that these measures can be grouped into a composite indicator of
strategic risk taking. Consequently, for each CEO, we calculated the sum of the three expenditures
into a single variable. This variable is positively related to CEO strategic risk taking on behalf of the
firm (Devers et al., 2008; Martin et al., 2013).
4.3 | Independent variables
4.3.1 | CEO equity risk bearing
Consistent with prior behavioral agency research (e.g., Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007; Martin et al.,
2013; Wowak et al., 2015), we focus on stock options to capture CEO equity wealth that creates risk
bearing. This is justified by both the ubiquity of CEO stock option pay and the high-powered incen-
tives associated with stock options (Gomez-Mejia, Neacsu, & Martin, 2017; Jensen, 2005). CEO
equity risk bearing was calculated using the combined value of exercisable and unexercisable stock
options, where we take the number of options from each option grant and multiply it by their corre-
sponding spread (for in-the-money options) on the last day of each their firm's fiscal year in t − 1.
Data on stock options was collected from Execucomp.
4.4 | Moderating variables
4.4.1 | CEO personality
As noted above, we measured CEO personality using the CAQ. Following Peterson et al. (2003), we
used the CAQ developed by Block (1978). The CAQ is a 100-item extensively validated and used
instrument to make comprehensive assessments of individual five factor personality (for a detailed
list of the 100-items included in the CAQ see Block, 1978: 8–12). Indirect methods to measure per-
sonality such as the CAQ have been extensively used in the field of psychology (e.g., Peterson et al.,
2003) and other disciplines such as political economy (e.g., Hermann, 1976, 1980) to evaluate the
personality of individuals based on archival data (for an overview of historiometric techniques used
to quantify leaders' character traits see Ligon, Harris, & Hunter, 2012). Prior studies have also vali-
dated the CAQ as it has been applied to the five-factor model (McCrae & Costa, 1987). The CAQ
includes items such as “Behaves ethically” (conscientiousness), “Is critical, sceptical, not easy to
impress” (neuroticism), “Behaves assertively” (extraversion), and “Has a wide range of interests”
(openness). In total, we used three independent raters during the data collection process. For each
CEO, we assigned two of those raters to complete the CAQ. Each coder was a postgraduate student
in clinical psychology with extensive background knowledge on personality research. We repeatedly
instructed the two coders assigned to the same dossier not to communicate with each other about the
sorting process to ensure that the sorts were completed independently. Since all coders had a back-
ground in clinical psychology, it was also unlikely that they had in-depth knowledge about neither
the CEOs in our sample nor the companies. However, we also repeatedly instructed the coders to
only base their sorts on the information included in the CEO dossiers and not on information outside
these packages.
Before aggregating the CAQ ratings from the two coders assigned to the same dossier to form a
composite measure, we conducted several analyses to ensure our data exhibited sufficient reliability,
consistency, and agreement (Bliese, 2000). First, we calculated the average interrater correlation
between the two raters, the intraclass correlation coefficient 1 (ICC1) and 2 (ICC2) (Bliese, 2000;
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Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) to assess whether it met the statistical criteria for aggregating individual
responses from each CEO. ICC(1) assumes random selection of raters and equal numbers of individ-
ual raters (Glick, 1985) and represents the reliability associated with single assessment of the group
mean of ratings (Peterson et al., 2003). ICC(2) is a measure of the reliability of the group means on
an aggregate variable; in the present case the reliability of the mean of the raters. The average ICC
(1) and the average ICC(2) were 0.61 and 0.76, respectively. Second, we calculated an interrater
agreement score (rwg; LeBreton & Senter, 2008) as it represents a comparison of the variance in
judges' ratings of a CEO's personality to an expected variance based on random responses. The inter-
rater reliability is Cohen's Kappa, which ranges from 0 to 1 (although negative numbers are possible),
where larger numbers mean better reliability. We assumed a uniform distribution of ratings to gener-
ate the expected variance. For the CAQ, the average interrater correlation was 0.68, based upon
316 comparisons (158 CEOs). Most researchers prefer Kappa values to be at least 0.60 before claim-
ing a good level of agreement (Glick, 1985). Together, these analyses supported our decision for
aggregating ratings across the two raters and creating the mean rating of each CEO. To obtain scores
on the personality traits, we followed Peterson et al. (2003) and computed factor scores for each per-
sonality dimension using the factor loadings for the CAQ reported by McCrae et al. (1986). We sub-
sequently rescaled all scores to a 9-point scale. The composite ratings for each CEO included in our
sample are available upon request.
4.5 | Control variables
We controlled for possible alternative explanations by including a number of control variables. At
the CEO level, we controlled for gender by including a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the
CEO was female, and 0 if otherwise. We also included CEO tenure (in months) as a control variable
as prior work experiences may indicate differences in knowledge and abilities that influence risk tak-
ing (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In line with this reasoning, the same logic may also apply to CEO
age. Therefore, we controlled for CEO age in years. We also controlled for CEO duality which is
positively related to the CEO's influence upon firm behaviors (Lim, 2015). CEO duality was coded
as a binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the CEO also held a position of board chairperson, and
0 if otherwise.
To control for other types of compensation we include measures of CEO restricted stock, pro-
spective wealth and cash. Restricted stock was measured as the aggregate market value of restricted
stock held by the CEO at fiscal year-end in t − 1. Prospective wealth is the potential additional
wealth that a CEO estimates could be realized in the event of successful risk taking (Martin et al.,
2013). Consistent with prior research (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2013, 2015), prospec-
tive wealth is calculated as: Prospective wealth = Number of Options Held × [(1.068time × Stock
Price) − Stock Price]. Cash is the value of cash compensation (bonus and cash pay) the CEO has
received in year t−1.
At the firm level we controlled for three important variables. First, we controlled for firm size as
prior research has shown that this might affect risk taking. Firm size was measured by using the natu-
ral logarithm of total assets in each firm to reduce skewness (Audia & Greve, 2006). Second, we con-
trolled for free cash flow to account for project inefficiencies. Free cash flow is measured as follows
(Iyer & Miller, 2008): (EBITDA − CapEx − (Working capital t − 1 − Working capital t − 2)/Total
assets). Third we controlled for firm performance. Firm performance was measured using a proxy for
Tobin's q (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). We measured the firm-level control variables at time t − 1. Lastly,
we included year dummies to control for differences in strategic risk taking across time with 2012
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being the reference category. Similarly, we also include industry dummies to control for unobserved
differences across manufacturing industries.
4.6 | Estimation and procedures
To evaluate whether the interplay between and equity risk bearing would influence strategic risk tak-
ing, we examined the trait data using generalized linear models (GLM). GLM models are mathemati-
cal extensions of linear models that do not force data into unnatural scales, and thereby allow for
nonlinearity and nonconstant variance structures in the data (Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990). Because the
data in our sample are pooled time series, where firm-year represents the observation, GLM was
appropriate as it allows us to specify any degree of interaction effects. Moreover, GLM has the
advantage to obtain robust standard errors that are corrected for over dispersion (McCullagh, 1984).
Thus, GLM is more flexible and better suited for analyzing time series data (McCullagh & Nelder,
1989). We ran our GLM models using a Gaussian (normal) distribution with an identity link function.
Since we included time invariant variables in the models (such as our personality scores), we did not
use a fixed-effect models. Instead, we used a random-effects model which is most appropriate when
including time-invariant variables. For all regressions in our model we used robust variance estima-
tors (White, 1980). Finally, we calculated z-scored for all variables, except for strategic risk taking,
before calculating the interaction variables (Aiken & West, 1991).
5 | RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses and their empirical support. Table 2 presents the descriptive sta-
tistics for the variables included in our study. Consistent with prior research (Herrmann & Nadkarni,
2014), there was a high correlation between conscientiousness and extraversion, and conscientious-
ness and openness. Additional post-regression diagnostics showed that the VIF scores remain well
below the commonly accepted threshold of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Thus, we mul-
ticollinearity appears not to be an issue in our study.
Table 3 presents the results. Model 1 contains the control variables. Models 2–5 include CEO
equity risk bearing variable—i.e., CEO risk bearing associated with stock options—and the personal-
ity traits as moderators of the former relationship. Model 6 includes all interactions. All models were
highly significant according to the Wald χ2 test.
Hypothesis 1 suggests that CEO conscientiousness accentuates the negative effect of CEO equity
risk bearing on strategic risk taking. In Model 2b, the interactive effect of conscientiousness and
equity risk bearing is significant and negative (γ = −0.07, SE = 0.03, [95% confidence interval:
(−0.014, −0.008)], p = 0.04), indicating that the relation between equity risk bearing and strategic
risk taking becomes weaker when a CEO's conscientiousness is low than when it is high. In practical
terms, for each one standard deviation increase in conscientiousness, CEO strategic risk taking in
response to equity risk bearing decreases by a further 41%. For CEOs with high conscientiousness
(one SD above the mean) the effect of equity risk bearing on their strategic risk taking becomes
weaker, whereas for CEOs that have low conscientiousness (one SD below the mean) the relationship
is positive (see Figure 1a). These results provide support for Hypothesis 1.
Next, we tested Hypothesis 2 predicting that CEO neuroticism accentuates the negative effect of
equity risk bearing on strategic risk taking. As shown in Model 3b, while we did find a direct nega-
tive effect of neuroticism on strategic risk taking (γ = −0.68, p = 0.03), the interactive effect of
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FIGURE 1 (a) Interaction effect of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) conscientiousness on the relationship between equity risk
bearing and strategic risk taking. (b) Interaction effect of CEO extraversion on the relationship between equity risk bearing and
strategic risk taking. (c) Interaction effect of CEO openness on the relationship between equity risk bearing and strategic risk
taking. Notes. (a) Low conscientiousness is one standard deviation below the mean and high conscientiousness is one standard
deviation above the mean. (b) Low extraversion is one standard deviation below the mean and high extraversion is one
standard deviation above the mean. (c) Low openness is one standard deviation below the mean and high openness is one
standard deviation above the mean
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equity risk bearing and neuroticism was negative but nonsignificant (γ = −0.03, p = 0.41), rejecting
Hypothesis 2. We address this in the Discussion.
According to Hypothesis 3, CEO extraversion attenuates the negative effect of CEO equity risk
bearing on strategic risk taking. As shown in Model 4b, the interactive effect of stock and extraver-
sion is positive and significant (γ = 0.05, SE = 0.01, [95% confidence interval: (0.028–0.067)],
p = 0.00), indicating that the negative relationship between CEO equity risk bearing and strategic
risk taking becomes weaker when CEOs are more extraverted (see Figure 1b). For one standard devi-
ation increase in extraversion, CEO strategic risk taking in response to equity risk bearing increases
by an additional 25%. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Lastly, we tested whether CEO openness to experience attenuates the negative effect of CEO
equity risk bearing on risk taking. We found support for Hypothesis 4 as the interactive effect of
CEO wealth associated with equity risk bearing and openness was positive and significant (Model
5b; γ = 0.11, SE = 0.02, [95% confidence interval: (−0.013–0.002)], p = 0.00). CEOs with that
score high on openness, the effect of equity risk bearing on strategic risk taking becomes much stron-
ger, whereas for CEOs that have low scores on openness, the relation is negative (see Figure 1c).
Thus, for one standard deviation increase in openness, CEO strategic risk taking in response to equity
risk bearing increases by a further 32%. We therefore conclude that CEO openness does indeed atten-
uate the CEO's response to their equity risk bearing.
5.1 | Robustness tests and endogeneity
We performed several supplementary analyses to examine the robustness of the findings with a focus
on issues broadly related to endogeneity concerns. Most importantly, we control for endogeneity of
CEO equity wealth, given the possibility that strategic risk itself may be an antecedent of these com-
pensation measures (Martin et al., 2013). Withers, Certo, and Semadeni (2014) provide evidence
showing endogeneity does not systematically bias estimates of interaction coefficients; yet, caution
that models that include interaction terms should control for endogeneity of the main effect of endog-
enous variable that is interacted (i.e., CEO equity wealth). We performed 2SLS regressions for each
of our models using several instrumental variables for CEO equity wealth, such as number of shares
owned (t − 2), the number of unexercised exercisable options (t − 2), number of restricted stock
holdings (t − 2), number of unexercised unexercisable options (t − 2), and value of restricted stock
holdings (t − 2). Results remained robust to the endogeneity control. The instruments were found to
be exogenous and valid as the Sargan's J-test of over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the null
hypothesis (p = 0.28) (Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2014). Moreover, the F-statistic in our first stage
model was also significant (p = 0.00).
As another robustness check, we also conducted the same set of analysis without any control vari-
ables in order to probe the influence of contextual variables (Glaser, Stam, & Takeuchi, 2016). Run-
ning analysis with and without control variables is important because it allows us to better
understand the impact of the control variables on the relationship between our explanatory variables
and the dependent variable (Glaser et al., 2016). Said differently, running analysis without control
variables offers important information about the utility of our explanatory variables to explain uncon-
trolled variance in the dependent variable (see Becker et al., 2016 for a discussion; see also Breaugh,
2006). Our results were unaffected by exclusion of any of these control variables, providing support
for the validity of our findings.
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6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The objective of this study has been to examine the role of personality in shaping CEO strategic risk
taking in response to equity risk bearing. We have done so by examining how conscientiousness,
neuroticism, extraversion, and openness moderate the relationship between CEO equity risk bearing
and strategic risk taking. We have found that CEO conscientiousness accentuates the negative rela-
tionship between equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking, while extraversion and openness neu-
tralize reductions in strategic risk taking in response to equity risk bearing. We believe that our
findings have important implications for theory and practice.
6.1 | Theoretical implications
Behavioral agency research examining principal-agent incentive alignment has demonstrated that
CEO strategic risk taking is influenced by various compensation related measures of risk bearing,
such as the accumulated value of stock options (e.g., Devers et al., 2008; Larraza-Kintana et al.,
2007; Martin et al., 2013). Central to the majority of this research has been a prediction that the CEO
will take less risk as their risk bearing—including equity risk bearing—increases. However, our find-
ings suggest that each individual will make sense of the risk to their equity wealth in different ways,
contingent on their various personality traits. By doing so, our study addresses the simplifying
assumption inherent to BAM that there are no individual differences in the evaluation of risk to
endowed equity wealth in any given situation. Specifically, we demonstrate that CEOs differ in how
they respond to risk bearing, contingent upon personality. This suggests that risk perception—or the
extent to which the CEO perceives that risk taking on behalf of their firm threatens their equity
wealth—is shaped by their personality; this in turn explains heterogeneous responses to equity risk
bearing. As such, given the demonstrated importance of understanding personality when predicting
response to compensation, our study therefore offers an avenue for enhancing the predictive validity
of a theory that has been criticized for its inability to predict managerial agent (CEO) risk behavior
(Wowak & Hambrick, 2010).
Eisenhardt's (1989) seminal review of agency theory long ago advised that agency theory and
understanding of the links between incentives (such as equity incentives) and firm behaviors will be
advanced by integrating its predictions with other theoretical perspectives. This advice has largely
gone unheeded, limiting the progress of agency theory (Boyd & Solarino, 2016). In integrating the
five-factor model from applied psychology our framework highlights the importance of the most
ubiquitous predictor of human behavior (personality traits; Peterson et al., 2003) when considering
the effectiveness of equity pay as a mechanism for aligning the risk preferences of managerial agents
with those of principals-shareholders. Indeed, the significance of personality in the relationship
between CEO equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking is underlined by Figure 1a–c, graphically
TABLE 1 Moderating effect of personality traits upon relationship between equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking
Theoretical logic
Predicted moderation
effect Supported
Conscientiousness Increases perceived risk to firm performance and equity wealth Accentuation Yes
Neuroticism Increases perceived risk to firm performance and equity wealth Accentuation No
Extraversion Decreases perceived risk to firm performance and equity wealth Attenuation Yes
Openness Decreases perceived risk to firm performance and equity wealth Attenuation Yes
Agreeableness No clear indication of how moderation will work and hence we
do not hypothesize
N/A N/A
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demonstrating how the relationship between equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking becomes
positive when CEOs have (a) low levels of conscientiousness; (b) high levels of extraversion; and
(c) high levels of openness. That is, BAM's predicted relationship between risk bearing and strategic
risk taking is no longer negative; the slope of the relationship changes sign once these nuances of per-
sonality are considered. Hence, although we did not hypothesize cross-over interaction effects, our
findings indicate BAM's predicted negative relationship between risk bearing and strategic risk taking
can only be observed for CEOs with certain personality traits; otherwise, the relationship becomes
positive.
From a behavioral perspective, our results also advance the CEO decision making literature by
suggesting that CEO framing of strategic decision making can be endogenous to the decision maker.
That is, personality traits lead the CEO to frame strategic risk taking as (a) a threat to their wealth that
is to be avoided, given the greater salience of loss outcomes; or (b) an opportunity to enhance equity
wealth, given the greater salience of gain outcomes. Using the five-factor model of personality traits
allows academics, analysts or boards to predict which end of the spectrum a CEO is more likely to
sit. That is, conscientiousness leads to greater salience of loss outcomes, while extraversion and open-
ness leads to greater salience of gain outcomes. This insight builds on the mixed gamble approach to
behavioral agency, which suggested that CEOs are likely to estimate prospective losses and prospec-
tive gains, weighing one against the other when making strategic decisions (e.g., Bromiley, 2009;
Martin et al., 2013). Specifically, our research suggests that in addition to considering the magnitude
of those prospective losses and gains at the firm and personal level, CEOs will likely direct their
attention to losses and gains unequally, due to factors associated with personality. Moreover, our
cross-over interaction underlines the importance of considering salience of outcomes, or the endoge-
nous framing referred to above.
With regard to the incentive alignment literature, our research provides an important boundary
condition when evaluating the incentive alignment qualities of equity based pay. Seminal agency
research has highlighted that equity ownership by managers aligns their financial fate and mitigates
opportunism, yet creates a divergence in risk preferences, given that equity risk bearing likely means
that the agent has less tolerance for risk than their shareholders (principals) (Eisenhardt, 1989). This
agency problem of risk sharing has resulted in positivist agency scholars devoting much research
effort to considering how to mitigate the potentially negative consequences of agent risk aversion that
is predicted to result from equity grants. Our research suggests that predictions of the risk behavior
that CEOs exhibit in response to equity ownership are likely to offer a useful, yet incomplete under-
standing of the cognitive processes that shape the CEO's response to their risk bearing. Without
explicitly considering the CEO's personality, and how their personality will shape their perception of
risk, we may conclude that the CEO will respond to changes in risk bearing in an opposite way to
that previously predicted. In particular, extraversion, openness and low levels of conscientiousness
have the potential to reverse BAM's first proposition regarding the effect of risk bearing upon risk
taking. Hence, the consequences of equity incentives for incentive alignment will be vastly different
if individuals diverge by at least one standard deviation from the mean for extraversion, openness
and conscientiousness.
Our nonfindings with regard to neuroticism cast doubt on the role of emotional stability in shap-
ing CEO responses to equity incentives. One explanation for this comes from the relationship
between neuroticism and impulsiveness (Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, & Barrick, 1999). Impulsiveness
is associated with unpredictability, suggesting limitations in our ability to accurately predict how a
neurotic CEO will respond to their equity risk bearing (Dijker, Koomen, & Kok, 1997). Neurotic
CEOs are also more likely to exhibit dysfunctional behaviors, yet are very self-conscious of these
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behaviors, meaning they attempt to conceal external manifestations of their emotional instability
(Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998). This suggests neurotic CEOs are less likely to exhibit systematic pat-
terns that would be detected in empirical analyses.
In terms of the behavioral literature more broadly, behavioral strategy has previously drawn upon
various streams from cognitive and social psychology, including behavioral decision research
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993), sensemaking and cognitive schema (Porac & Thomas, 1990), or
behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963). Further, single dimension analysis of behavior
effects of CEO traits such as narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011) or overconfidence
(Li & Tang, 2010) has moved the literature forward and provided the catalyst for our research; yet
we have highlighted the benefits to the predictive validity of this theory generated by also considering
the influence of conscientiousness, extraversion and openness. As such, we advance a nascent but
evolving literature that has underlined the role of a different stream of cognitive psychology (the
“Big Five” personality traits) in helping strategy scholars advance research agendas. Specifically, our
theory emphasizes the value of exploring multiple personality traits when predicting CEO behaviors,
given each trait separately influences CEOs' response to compensation.
Lastly, we also contribute to upper echelons theory by demonstrating the value added of consider-
ing the interaction effects of executive characteristics and compensation on firm risk taking. Upper
echelons theory emphasizes that strategic choices will be influenced by perceptions, cognition and
values of their executives. Despite consistent calls for research that integrates upper echelons theory
with executive compensation theory (Hambrick, 2007), there is still relatively little work that exam-
ines why executives differ in their responses to compensation arrangements. That is, the majority of
research continues to study the effect of executive characteristics or incentives on risk taking in isola-
tion. Complementing the few studies that have started to address this shortcoming (e.g., Mannor
et al., 2016; Wowak et al., 2015; Wowak & Hambrick, 2010), we show that in order to understand
changes in behavioral responses to compensation it is indeed important to consider differences in
executives' personality. Our study suggests that executives' behavioral changes cannot solely be pre-
dicted through a compensation lens. Behavioral change can only be more accurately predicted if com-
pensation is considered together with executives' personality.
6.2 | Practical implications
From a practical perspective, our findings underline the importance that should be placed on design-
ing CEO compensation contracts only after analyzing the CEO's personality. The significant influ-
ence of the various personality traits in shaping CEO behaviors in response to incentives also
underlines the pitfalls of relying on blanket assertions with regard to the likely behavioral effects of
the CEO's compensation. Instead, our theory provides the board with a strong basis for ensuring that
they design the compensation contract—including granting of stock options—so that the CEO takes
risks that are consistent with the firm's strategy.
6.3 | Limitations and future research
As with all empirical projects, ours is also not free of limitations. First, our measures of the big five
personality traits are inevitably imprecise in the sense that we were not able to directly measure the
CEO's personality profiles. Given the focus on CEOs of the largest manufacturing firms in the US
and the sensitivity of personality data, adopting a previously validated unobtrusive measure was the
necessary choice. Yet, while we are confident that our previously validated measures yield generally
meaningful results, further research may endeavor to develop alternative ways to measure CEO
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personality (see Ligon et al., 2012). Second, we have examined our theoretical framework in the con-
text of the manufacturing sector. This approach allows us to compare and contrast our findings with
prior behavioral agency theory research. Yet, while there is no reason to believe that our results are
sector-specific, we encourage future research that replicates our framework in other sectors.
Overall, we have provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the role of personality traits in
predicting managerial agent (CEO) responses to equity risk bearing. The theory and empirical results
underscore the importance of considering individual personality traits when designing CEO incen-
tives or anticipating the need for additional monitoring due to the personality traits distorting the
intended risk incentives created by equity based pay.
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